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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EU1 in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in die areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 
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Just as much of Egypt’s economic infrastructure, including the still large public 
sector, is the legacy of a command economy, so, too, is the political 
infrastructure (the constitutional/legal framework within which politics is 
conducted, as well as the institutions and organizations through which public 
policies are demanded, contested, decided, implemented, and adjudicated) 
largely the residue of a command polity. The Egyptian constitutional/legal 
framework, for example, includes such throwbacks as an emergency law and a 
structural imbalance between the branches and levels of government. The ruling 
National Democratic Party (NDP) is the direct lineal descendant of the former 
Leninist-style Arab Socialist Union, while ministries of “information” and 
“social affairs,” whose purposes during the earlier era were, respectively, to 
control the flow of information and the activities of voluntary associations, are 
still extant. A limited amount of new political infrastructure, such as weak 
opposition political parties, a more free press, and some advocacy NGOs, has 
emerged over the past quarter century or so, but it is still overshadowed by the 
much more robust edifices erected during the Nasser era.
Structural adjustment of this political infrastructure, whereby open 
political markets would be made possible, appears to be lagging behind 
structural adjustment of the economy. The government of Egypt implicitly 
recognizes this apparent disjunction, but dimisses its importance. Its trumpeting 
of progress on economic reform, as manifested, for example, by President 
Mubarak’s claims for Egypt as a leading “emerging market” at the Davos World 
Economic Forum in January, 1999, is accompanied by what has become near 
silence about formerly heralded progress toward democratization. Whether in 
fact economic markets can emerge in the absence of open political ones is a vital 
question not only for Egypt, but for other countries also seeking to accelerate 
rates of economic growth while retaining political infrastructure inherited from 
command political economies of an earlier era.
In the discussion that follows of two illustrative components of that 
political infrastructure - the legal/judicial system and the executive branch - an 
attempt will be made to assess the state of that infrastructure and its direct impact 
on economic peformance. The remainder of the paper will then be devoted to an 
examination of the apparent de-linkage between economic and political 
structural adjustment. Some conclusions will be offered on the connections that 
may in fact link the two and their impact on strategies that preference economic 





























































































Issued in September, 1971, and slightly amended in 1980, Egypt’s constitution 
reflects its origins in the very earliest stage of transition away from the command 
polity. It expressed various aspirations for a more liberal system than had been 
enshrined in the 1964 constitution it replaced, but it provided few institutional 
manifestations of a liberal order. It seems to suggest that the then President, 
having diagnosed widespread popular dissatisfaction with the preceding 
authoritarian order, was reaching out to the populace to assure it that the abuses 
of that order would no longer occur, but that it was still too soon to contemplate 
the full institutionalization of a liberal, constitutional order. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the political opposition has over the past two decades repeatedly 
pointed out that the constitution is outdated, beholden to the earlier era, and 
unsuitable as a framework to support the growth of democracy.
The language of the Constitution regarding the economy reflects its 
origins. Article 4 provides that ‘The economic foundation of the Arab Republic 
of Egypt is the socialist democratic system based on sufficiency and justice, in a 
manner preventing exploitation.. . ” Article 26 guarantees workers a “share in the 
management and profits of projects,” two principles that were incorporated into 
the relevant legislation (i.e., Companies Law 159 of 1981 and Investment Law 
230 of 1989).
The Constitution’s anomalous provisions regarding the economy are 
mirrored by similarly anomalous provisions regarding the polity. The 
constitution subordinates the legislature to the executive by giving the latter 
power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, to 
select the vice president, to dismiss parliament in the event that it blocks 
legislation and fails to win a referendum on that legislation, to convene and 
terminate parliamentary sessions, and to effectively legislate during 
parliamentary recesses. The President is also the head of state, supreme 
commander of the armed forces, and the head of the executive branch. The 
constitution subordinates local to central government by assigning to the 
President the power to appoint governors; by placing all local government 
officials, including ‘umdahs (traditional mayors) and the Heads of Village Units; 
under the central executive; and by reserving most taxation, police and other 
powers to the national government.
Possibly also reflecting the public mood at the time the Constitution was 




























































































branch. In 1969 President Nasser sought to subordinate judges to the executive 
by transferring control over them to the Minister of Justice and removing many 
of them, in a step that was widely known as the “massacre of the judges.” In the 
event he overreached, for this was a highly unpopular step that underscored the 
government’s apparent contempt for the rule of law, in turn stimulating 
widespread support for “a state of laws,” a slogan that was in fact adopted by the 
new Sadat government. So while the Constitution created an imbalance between 
the legislative and executive branches in the latter’s favor, it did not do so with 
regard to the judicial branch.
The language of the Constitution regarding personal rights is quite 
fulsome, although in most cases those rights are substantially diluted by 
inclusion of the’ phrase that they are “in accordance with” or “defined by” 
enabling legislation. This approach also seems to reflect the tenor of the times - a 
clear desire to move toward constitutional guarantees of human and civil rights, 
but a realization that this would be a very sudden and dramatic step that could 
have far-reaching consequences, hence a step that should be somewhat qualified 
and tentative.
But with regard to the law, judges and courts, the Constitution is yet 
bolder in seeking tfc guarantee freedom and autonomy. Part IV proclaims the 
“sovereignty of the Law” and that the state is subject to it. It further mandates 
the “independence and immunity of the judiciary” as “two basic guarantees to 
safeguard rights and liberties.” Article 68 guarantees access to the courts for 
each citizen, who has "“the right to refer to his competent judge.” The 
Constitution requires that judges be independent, subject to no other authority 
than the law. If  also enshrines judicial review by prohibiting any law or 
administrative decision from having immunity from such review.
In sum, although the Constitution is not entirely illiberal, it is also not “a 
living document,” in the senses that it was either originally written in such a way 
or subsequently amended so as to provide for and reflect the evolution of the 
polity, or that all legislation has been brought in line with its provisions. The 
Constitution remains anchored in the past, having been amended only once, in 
1980, for the purpose of creating a consultative upper house, apparently to 
further consolidate executive control over the lower house. Much legislation is 
clearly in violation of the Constitution, yet remains in effect. Noteworthy in this 
regard is the constitutional provision that all citizens of either gender have equal 
rights and obligations, yet legislation regulating citizenship that precludes it from 
being awarded to a person bom of an Egyptian mother but a non-Egyptian 
father. Although the Constitution does not pose insurmountable obstacles to the 




























































































regulate the balance between the legislative and executive branches, and between 
national and local government, as well as the implicit qualifications it places on 
civil rights, ultimately will require amendment if a liberal, constitutional order is 
to be both implemented and properly reflected in the organic document itself.
Substantive Law
Whereas law that regulates economic activity has been steadily revised as 
economic reform has progressed, laws governing political behavior, after some 
early efforts at reform in the 1970s, have been either untouched or in the 1990s 
made yet more restrictive of political participation. The gap has thus widened 
between substantive economic law, which is increasingly supportive of a free 
market economy, and substantive “political” law, which is more consistent with 
a closed, than an open polity.
- as regards the economy
According to John Bentley,
“Egypt’s 20-year experiment with socialism and central planning severely and 
adversely impacted on the ability of Egypt’s legal infrastructure to facilitate and 
encourage private sector economic development. . .Substantive laws were skewed 
against the free market economy and private sector activity. . .(and) older commercial 
laws and institutions which were left in force during the socialist penod were ignored 
and never modernized.. .
Bentley himself actually played an instrumental role in commencing reform of 
substantive economic law, a process that has gathered momentum in recent 
years. He assisted in drafting Law 43 of 1974, the legal cornerstone of President 
Sadat’s infitah, or “opening.” Over the past quarter of a century the government 
of Egypt has addressed in reasonably systematic fashion the challenge of 
creating new substantive law to guide macro and micro economic policy reform. 
Some of the legal changes that are politically most difficult are yet to be 
completed, such as those that govern relations between owners and tenants of 
urban residential real estate and worker - management relations, but even in 
these areas progress has or appears about to be made. New landlord-tenant laws 
governing agricultural land and urban commercial real estate have already gone 
into effect, while the government has announced its intent to introduce into the 
1998-99 legislative session a new labor law, one that apparently will provide for 
the right to strike as a tradeoff against management’s right to dismiss. Moreover, 
some of the difficulties that have arisen as a result of inadequate or conflicting 
laws are now being addressed, such as the proposed Unified Companies Law, 




























































































consolidate and reconcile anomalies in the present eight laws governing the 
formation and operation of companies.
The pace and effectiveness of reform of substantive economic law has 
been hindered, however, by the manner in which that law is made. The process 
of making public policy, including enacting legislation into law, is narrow and 
hierarchical, thereby precluding adequate input by stakeholders into that process. 
Virtually all legislation is produced in the government itself, with individual 
ministries assuming primary responsibility for designing the content of proposed 
bills. Public hearings do not constitute part of the drafting process and only 
rarely are public hearings used when legislation is being considered in the 
standing committees of parliament. In the 1992 legislative session, for example, 
the 18 standing committees held a total of only 35 hearings, or less than two 
hearings for each committee. Five of these hearings were devoted to a single 
piece of legislation.2
Because many or most of the stakeholders who will be impacted by 
substantive law play little if any role in its formulation, the government is 
deprived of their information, insights, and reactions. Many of these 
stakeholders are in fact other units or levels of government. A ministry or agency 
may be seeking with a piece of legislation to address a specific problem, so it 
fails to realize that by addressing it in a particular way it will have an impact in 
other areas and on the functioning of other units of government. A common 
complaint about economic legislation that has been passed is that it creates more 
problems than it solves.
Mahmoud Fahmi, for example, Secretary General of the Maglis al Dawla, 
or State Council, and himself the architect of much of the legislation associated 
with economic reform, including that which formed the capital market authority 
and revived the stock exchange, has observed with regard to a key, recent piece 
of legislation that “it violates the constitution because it introduces articles with 
no legal precedents; its articles furthermore contradict other existing laws.” He 
sees a general problem of inconsistency in economic law having resulted from 
inadequate formulation of it.3 One of the principle recommendations of the 
Bentley report to the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) was to institutionalize procedures for “making, reviewing and revising 
laws and regulations” so that they are understood and supported by the public. In 
order to do so Bentley suggested that the policy process include
regular, broad-based review and input from the private sector and the public in a clear 
institutionalized manner regarding proposed draft laws and regulations affecting 
commerce and investment in Egypt by advance circulation of such laws to business 




























































































“Regular, broad-based review” is all the more important because Egypt follows 
the European civil law tradition, not Anglo-American common law. Substantive 
commercial law, for example, is embodied in the civil code of 1948, the 
forerunner of which was the Commercial Code of 1883, which in turn was 
inspired by the French Code Napoleon. Because judicial decisions under civil 
law do not constitute a formal source of law, as they do in common law 
(although precedents, especially the decisions of the administrative courts of the 
Council of State, are of some importance), evolution of law is necessarily slower 
than under common law. The greater relative importance of the substantive legal 
code and its more fixed nature imply that its content is of greater significance 
than is the case in a common law system. The formulation and reformulation of 
that law is, therefore, of particularly vital importance and places yet greater 
demands on policy making infrastructure than would be the case were Egypt to 
have a common law tradition, where judicial decisions could both update the law 
more quickly and deal more easily with shortcomings that arise in the legal code. 
Egypt’s economic reform, which to be successful must rest upon a constantly 
evolving body of substantive law, thus requires a more sophisticated 
infrastructure for the making of public policy than do many other emerging 
market countries, where judicial interpretation of common law acts to facilitate 
the legal and therefore the economic reform process.
In sum, the quality and possibly the quantity of substantive economic law 
enacted to support economic reform has suffered because of inadequate political 
infrastructure, a problem further aggravated by Egypt’s code based substantive 
law tradition. The policy making process, which culminates in the making of 
law, does permit of some limited, informal consultation, but broad based, 
institutionalized participation by numerous stakeholders is yet to become 
routinized.
- as regards the polity
The primary problem with regard to substantive law that regulates political 
activity is that it has not been progressively rewritten to support an expansion of 
participation or to bring about more accountable governance. The last major 
legislative initiative intended to broaden participation was the political parties 
law of 1977, which although legalizing political parties, nevertheless placed 
considerable restrictions on their formation and activities. Much legislation that 
restricts participation, including Law 32 of 1964, which strictly regulates the 
activities of voluntary associations, remains on the books. Further restrictive 
legislation, including that which converted the positions of 'umdah and 




























































































way for sequestration of professional syndicates on the rather spurious grounds 
of lack of quora at their general elections; that which substantially increased the 
penalties on journalists for libel and slander; and that which transferred the 
Central Auditing Agency from the Maglis al Sha'b (People’s Assembly, or 
lower house of parliament) to the Presidency, was passed in the mid to late 
1990s.
Thus while the constitution, a throwback to the earlier era, provides 
somewhat of a hindrance to expanded political participation and implementation 
of accountable governance, the substantive legal framework that has been 
erected is considerably more of an obstacle. That substantive economic law is 
moving in the opposite direction is both paradoxical and, ultimately, possibly 
non-sustainable. Not only is that economic law handicapped by the absence of a 
parallel evolution of “political” law that would provide for a more complex and 
competitive policy making environment, but that economic law may be creating 
the conditions that intensify demands for an open polity supported by an 
appropriate legal framework.
Courts and the Judiciary
Neither the courts nor the judiciary were ever converted into tools of “socialist 
transformation” in the same thoroughgoing manner in which most of the other 
political infrastructure was. It was only at almost the very end of that era that a 
full scale, frontal assault was made on the judiciary and its effect was less than 
total and was transitory in any case. This is not to say, however, that courts and 
the judiciary did not suffer in that era. While they were not converted into 
instruments to serve ideological ends, they were more or less ignored, so their 
capacities declined steadily for some two decades, leaving them as pale shadows 
of what they had been in 1952. The task of modernizing this component of the 
political infrastructure, therefore, is not that of dismantling inappropriate 
institutional legacies, but is one of upgrading badly decayed capacities.
The constitutional provisions which underlie the relative independence of 
the judiciary have already been cited. What needs to be added is the actual 
manner in which that relative independence is operationalized. Principally it is 
through the partial insulation of judges from the Ministry of Justice, a condition 
made possible by the limited self-governing capacity of the judges themselves. 
The principle vehicle of that self-government is the Supreme Judicial Council, a 
body within the Ministry of Justice empowered to make all decisions regarding 
the overall administration of the ordinary courts, including the appointment, 
promotion, and pay of judges (with the approval of the President). Article 173 of 




























































































proposed legislation that would affect the judiciary. It consists of the president of 
the Cassation (Highest Appeals) Court, together with the two most senior judges 
on that court plus the three most senior judges of the courts of appeal and the 
Prosecutor General.
Judicial self government is further replicated at lower levels, for in each 
court judges are governed by that court’s president and its general assembly, 
which is comprised of all its judges and a representative of General Prosecution, 
whose vote only counts on matters directly related to matters concerning 
prosecution. It is worth noting that President Mubarak substantially enhanced the 
independence of the judiciary when, in 1984 through Law 35, control of 
ordinary courts was returned to the Supreme Judicial Council, and through Law 
136 administrative courts were placed under the self-governing Council of State, 
which, as its former head, Mahmoud Fahmi points out, “is one place where 
democracy has been retained to a large degree.”
The independence of the judiciary, however, is more limited than this 
somewhat idealized picture would suggest. In practice the Ministry of Justice 
influences the rotation of judges between courts by invoking special needs, 
which it claims to be determined by case loads. It can thus in essence “assign” 
judges to deal with specific cases, as it did, for example, in the politically 
charged case of Professor Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who was accused of apostasy 
by fundamentalist colleagues, who sought to compel his divorce in court on the 
grounds that a non-Muslim male cannot be married to a Muslim female. The 
government sought to have overturned a politically awkward lower court 
decision that favored the fundamentalist interprertation in a higher court by 
assigning to that court a judge it thought to be sympathetic to its view. In 
addition to “assigning” judges to courts, the Ministry of Justice can also assign 
cases to specific courts, such as the notorious “Court Five” of the State Security 
Courts - notorious in the sense that it can be relied upon to hand down an 
extremely harsh sentence. The Ministry of Justice also affects remuneration and 
status, as it has the power to second judges to various governmental bodies, such 
as the National Center for Judicial Training or even the Cairo Opera House, 
where their salaries or bonuses may be considerable more than their base salary 
as a judge. The Ministry of Justice also has an Inspectorate of Judges that is 
responsible for detecting and prosecuting illegal behavior, a tool that can and 
possibly has been used to intimidate judges.
The capacity of courts to hold the executive accountable and in general to 
counterbalance its power is embodied in their organizational structure. The court 
system consists of three elements - ordinary courts of law, the Council of State’s 




























































































This last court has sole authority to rule on the constitutionality of draft laws, 
legislation, and even presidential decrees. Possibly because its judges are 
appointed by the President, it was for the first decade of its existence not viewed 
as a true guarantor of constitutional rights, as it ostensibly was intended. But in 
1979 it reversed the President’s decision to dissolve the board of the Bar 
Association and appoint a new head, ruling that these measures were illegal and 
that the previous board had to be reinstated.
Since then the Supreme Constitutional Court has not been reluctant to 
overturn on constitutional grounds legislation with direct political ramifications. 
It has twice ruled that the electoral system was unconstitutional. In 1985 it 
deemed the Personal Status Law of 1979 unconstitutional on the grounds that the 
president had, according to the urgency provision, issued it by decree when the 
Assembly was not in session. Since it was not urgent business, however, that 
provision was inapplicable. More recently, in November, 1998, it commenced 
consideration of the Penal Code’s provisions that provide harsh penalties, 
including up to a year’s imprisonment, for libel in order to determine whether 
they contradict articles 48, 206, 207 and/or 208, which provide for the freedom 
and independence of the press and other media. In the preceding year the Court 
had deemed unconstitutional a provision of the Press Law that stipulated 
imprisonment of editors for publication by their newspapers of libellous 
material. The Supreme Constitutional Court, therefore, has demonstrated a 
capacity to act as an arbiter of the rules of the political game, seeking 
intermittently to ensure that they are consistent with constitutional provisions.
Probably because it has taken its task of judicial review seriously, the 
Supreme Constitutional Court has recently come into confrontation with the 
executive. The issue that apparently triggered the move by the President to 
curtail the powers of the court was a ruling in 1998 that obligated the 
government to repay to taxpayers significant amounts of money that the Court 
ruled had been illegally collected by the government. Citing the adverse effect 
this decision would have on the development efforts of the state, the executive 
responded by issuing a Presidential Decree on 11 July, amending Law 48 of 
1979 that governs the Court. The effect of that amendment was to prevent the 
Court’s decisions from being applied retroactively, thereby seriously reducing 
the scope and deterrent value of judicial review. Critics of the President’s action 
claimed that it was both a serious violation of the independence of the judiciary 
and unconstitutional as there had been no urgent need to issue the decree, which 
should have been proposed as legislation when the parliamentary session 
commenced in November. Although the full ramifications of the Presidential 
Decree are not as yet clear, it does appear that the executive, essentially 




























































































restricted the role of the Supreme Constitutional Court. It is worth adding that 
informed observers of this Court note that its independent spirit was due at least 
in part to the spirited leadership of its former President, Awad al Murr, and that 
this spirit may well not be manifested under its new leadership.
The Council of State and the administrative courts over which it presides 
have also acted independently, so they also provide venues within which 
individuals can seek legal redress for torts committed against them by the 
government. Created in 1946 and modelled on the French equivalent, the 
purpose of the Council of State, which offers legal opinions on points of law, is 
to ensure that governmental agencies respect the law. It has the power to annul 
administrative decisions and to grant compensation to parties, including 
corporations and other types of business enterprises, injured by wrongful acts of 
the government.
Independent of the Ministry of Justice and ordinary courts, the Council of 
State provides another legal avenue for political activists in their efforts to 
induce the government to comply with the formal rules of the political game. 
Opposition political parties have made particular use of the Council of State and 
its Supreme Administrative court in their efforts to resume or commence 
activities in the face of numerous restrictive provisions of the 1977 law of 
political parties, including those that require party platforms to “preserve 
national unity and social peace” and which ban parties based on class, sectarian, 
gender, doctrinal or geographic bases, or which contradict the principles of 
Islamic law. The Law further specifies that a new party cannot duplicate the 
program of an existing party, a vague phrase that has been employed frequently 
to deny licenses to applicants by the Committee on Political Parties, which 
enforces the law and is chaired by the speaker of the Maglis al Shura 
(Consultative Council) and dominated by NDP ministers. The very looseness of 
the language of the Law and the tendency of the Committee to abuse even the 
wide discretionary power it confers has been seized upon intermittently since 
1983 by the Supreme Administrative Court of the Council of State in order to 
overturn decisions by the Committee. Indeed, of the 13 opposition political 
parties presently in existence, nine commenced or recommenced operations as a 
result of a ruling by that court. Had the Committee on Political Parties been the 
sole arbiter in this matter, only the four parties that existed in 1979 - the NDP, 
Liberal Labor, and Tagammu - would now be legally functioning.
Prosecutors can also be considered as part of the political infrastructure, 
for occasionally they become directly involved in political matters. The 
Administrative Prosecution is an independent authority under the overall 




























































































of laws or regulations by government officials and agencies, which, if found to 
exist, are referred by it to the General Prosecution (i.e., the public prosecutor), 
known in Arabic as the niyaba. The niyaba, a branch of the Ministry of Justice, 
are expected to act impartially as judges when investigating cases, reviewing 
evidence that indicates both innocence and guilt before possibly formulating 
charges to be presented to a criminal court. Since it is the niyaba who have the 
responsibility to determine whether or not confessions have been extracted by 
torture or other illegal means, as well as to visit prisons to monitor treatment of 
detainees and hear grievances, they have been in a key position to restrain 
government abuses of power and occasionally have done so. In 1994, for 
example, the niyaba authorized the family of a lawyer who allegedly died while 
being tortured by State Security Investigations, to sue the police. The niyaba's 
action in revealing the torture of defendants also resulted in the acquittal of those 
accused of assassinating the speaker of the People’s Assembly in 1990 and in the 
trial of 60 security officers on charges of torturing the alleged assassins of 
President Sadat.
The courts and the judiciary, including the prosecutors, clearly provide a 
significant bulwark against unconstitutional and/or illegal behavior by the 
executive. Indeed, their very success has, to some extent, been their undoing. 
Confronted with independent judges and prosecutors working in a highly 
elaborated system of courts easily accessible to opposition political activists, 
executive authorities have adopted the expedient of circumventing those courts 
or not implementing their decisions. The Minister of Interior, for example, has 
frequently refused to release from prison detainees whose release has been 
ordered by the courts, while the government has utilized the state of emergency’s 
provisions that permit reference of civil cases to military and emergency state 
security courts, where judgements are not subject to appeal to a higher court and 
where judges are much less autonomous of executive authority.
Permanent state security courts do not require reference to the state of 
emergency and have their own niyaba and appeals court system. Two of their 
three or five judges, depending on whether they are at the summary or appeal 
level, can be appointed from the military by the President. These courts have the 
power to try “political” crimes, such as establishing or organizing or directing an 
illegal group or an organization with the help of a foreign government; illegally 
resisting the state policy with the help of a foreign government; spreading lies or 
untrue stories with the intention to harm the country; to strike, etc. In the absence 
of these various means to circumvent the normal court system, the rule of law 
would be much more firmly established, assuming, of course, that the executive 




























































































The firm establishment of the rule of law is also hindered by the 
inadequate capacities of the courts and judiciary. Having been seriously 
degraded during the previous era, they have not been adequately overhauled and 
upgraded since then. In the meantime, the case load of all courts has dramatically 
increased. In 1998, for example, some 32 million legal cases were filed, meaning 
that statistically speaking, virtually every Egyptian was involved in a new legal 
matter that year, for each case requires a plaintiff and defendant. The Bentley 
report, noting that justice delayed is justice denied, cites examples from the 
experience of his prestigious Cairo firm where cases have dragged on for twenty 
years without resolution. Partly because of overwhelming case loads, courts are 
not looked upon as arenas in which definitive decisions are issued. Rather, 
lodging cases in courts typically forms part of broader strategies of obtaining 
advantages in protracted conflicts involving family, business, or other matters.
Deterioration of the court system has caused potential litigants of higher 
status to seek to avoid those courts altogether, typically by resolving disputes 
through arbitration. Most foreign business enterprises operating in Egypt, for 
example, insist upon arbitration clauses in all contracts in order to avoid having 
to settle disputes before Egyptian courts. Nathan Brown has observed that the 
“most obvious loser is domestic business. Less able in constructing private 
arbitration systems, but equally repelled by slow litigation procedures, owners of 
small businesses have few attractive options. . .Egypt’s court system, like the 
country’s physical infrastructure, is over burdened and built to service the needs 
of a large and poor population.”6
Severe as the problems are that bedevil the court system, their resolution 
would not necessarily profoundly impact the administration of justice, at least 
immediately. Implementation of court decisions remains as problematical, or 
even more so, than obtaining decisions in the first instance. While this problem 
is due in part to inadequate provisions for implementation by the courts, such as 
lack of well trained bailiffs or unwieldy procedures for notifying litigants of 
decisions and their consequences, it is due in larger measure to the lack of 
linkages between the judicial and executive branches.
A price of the relative autonomy and independence of the judiciary and 
the courts is that the executive is less than rigorous in its implementation of court 
decisions. The courts can decide, but they cannot enforce their decisions in the 
absence of support from the executive. While “stove piping” is a common 
problem throughout the government, it is particularly pronounced as regards 
relations between the judicial and executive branches, rendering all the more 
difficult the task of improving the administration of justice, for that task 




























































































government. That task, moreover, is rendered all the more difficult by the strong 
desire of the courts and judiciary to retain their autonomy, and of the executive 
not to reinforce the power of the judicial branch by rigorously implementing its 
decisions.
The Le gal/Judicial System - Summary•
This component of the political infrastructure presents a mixed picture. The 
constitution reflects much of the legacy of the command economy and polity of 
the earlier era. Substantive law regarding the economy has undergone steady 
revision to bring it in line with the imperatives of a free enterprise economy, but 
the quality and quantity of that law has been negatively affected by the policy 
making process, which remains rudimentary in comparison to those in more 
competitive, open polities. No serious effort has been made to revise substantive 
law to make it consistent with participatory, accountable governance, and those 
changes that have been made reflect a desire to restrict, rather than to expand 
participation and accountability. Finally, the judiciary and the courts are 
remarkably independent and autonomous and have made a major contribution to 
expanding the political space in which various stakeholders can express their 
views and even contest public policy. But their very success has contributed to 
their being circumvented or ignored by the executive, leaving them with both 






























































































The Legacy o f the command political economy
Of the three branches of government, the executive was most impacted by the 
imposition of the command political economy. While the high status and legal 
standing of the judiciary and court systems protected them in part from the 
ravages of “democratic centralism,” and while the political standing and 
potential utility of the Parliament also cushioned it from the heaviest blows, the 
executive, over which the government had direct, undisputed control, became its 
principle tool for achieving three major objectives - active control/surveillance 
of the population, mobilization of certain sectors of it, and cultivation of passive 
support through the distribution of patronage. Consequently, the nominal core 
purpose of this or any executive branch, namely, implementing public policy, 
was relegated to secondary importance. The inevitable result was that the quality 
of governance steadily deteriorated. Little has been done to rehabilitate the 
executive, to say nothing of modernizing it or redefining its mission from that 
assigned during the preceding era to one of supporting economic structural 
adjustment. It remains, therefore, a major obstacle to both more rapid economic 
growth and to the steady evolution of participatory, accountable governance.
The legacy of the control function remains more or less intact and is 
suffused throughout the executive branch. Although new, functionally specific 
administrative bodies were created during the Nasser era in order to control the 
population, including a vast array of domestic intelligence services and 
barracked police forces, chief of which is the Central Security Force, probably 
the more serious, residual problem is that posed by the redefinition of the 
mission of the normal civilian bureaucracy. The Ministry of Local 
Administration was assigned the task of controlling local politics and elections, 
as were, in some measure, the Ministries of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs was made into an organization to oversee 
activities of voluntary associations, while the various public sector companies 
were given the task, among others, of mobilizing their labor forces for electoral 
purposes. A chief function of the ministries of Industry and Labor was to prevent 
worker unrest, while the Ministry of Education (and then Higher Education) had 
as a major objective the prevention of student demonstrations.
The Ministry of Information was placed in charge of monitoring and 
censoring the flow of information.
The radical Islamist insurrection that commenced in 1992 stimulated the 




























































































to combat that insurrection. The accountability of such forces, as well as the 
normal police, has been eroded, probably both as a result of the severity of the 
security task itself, and as a result of inadequate training in appropriate 
police/security behavior in the first instance.
In sum, a vast bureaucracy and public sector was given over in part to 
ensuring that there be no autonomous, voluntary activity that might have 
negative implications for the political support of the regime. As a result, the 
structures of those organizations and the mentalities of those working within 
them were and for the most part remain inconsistent with a free market economy, 
to say nothing of a liberal polity. Although the government’s preoccupation with 
control has abated, it still remains a consideration, constituting one of the 
principal, implicit “mission statements” of many arms of the public 
administration. Unless and until the executive’s primary mission statement is 
made congruent with economic and political structural adjustment, little progress 
can be made in administrative reform.
A second function of the executive during the earlier era was to mobilize 
various sectors of the population, especially those that had been at least partially 
excluded from meaningful political and economic participation in the liberal, 
constitutional era, hence were important potential bases of support for the new 
regime. While the Leninist single party, the Arab Socialist Union and its various 
ancillary organizations, were the chief vehicles of this mobilization, the 
executive branch contributed its part. Agricultural Cooperative Societies, 
especially those in land reform areas, were utilized to mobilize the peasantry, 
and they were backed up by the new local government structure. The Ministry of 
Labor played a similar role vis a vis industrial workers.
Assumed by the executive during the Nasser era, this mobilization 
function was more or less jettisoned by his successor. President Sadat sought to 
build a new, different base of political support and had less interest in continuing 
to mobilize peasants and workers. As a result he converted the agricultural 
cooperative societies into the Agricultural Credit Bank, stripping it of the 
political mobilization task; increased the importance of parliament (in which, 
paradoxically, workers and peasants had little influence, despite the requirement 
that they constitute half the membership), and downgraded the importance of the 
single party; and allowed the mobilization capacities of the ministry of labor and 
its associated unions to wither.
The consequence of the dismantling of the mobilizational capacity of the 
Nasserist executive is that the sectors of the population which gained political 




























































































engage with the political system. Although this infrastructure for mobilization 
was paternalistic and ultimately focused on control of the sectors it was 
responsible for mobilizing, it nevertheless did provide channels through which 
the economically deprived could both place demands and receive material 
rewards. It may be partially for this reason that the Nasser era was one of 
remarkable social and political quietude, given the magnitude of change that 
occurred.
Ultimately it is probably the third function - that of distributing patronage 
- that has been the most difficult for the contemporary executive to overcome, 
for the entire administrative structure was converted to this purpose, for in the 
first instance patronage mean government jobs. The public administration rose 
from a few tens of thousands when Nasser took power, to some three million 
when he died, to over five million when President Mubarak assumed power. 
Although it has plateaued at that figure in recent years, the civil service and 
public sector to this day employ inordinately high percentages of the labor force 
(overall, about one third), which is presently some seventeen million. In the case 
of women with university degrees working in urban areas, about four fifths are 
so employed. In rural areas government employment typically accounts for more 
than half of employment outside agriculture, while in urban areas it accounts for 
somewhat less than one third of male employment. Although younger male 
Egyptians are less likely to be employed by government than older age cohorts, 
reflecting the fact that the government has been absorbing a declining percentage 
of those entering the labor market, the percentage is still high by world 
standards. The guarantee of a government job for graduates - although much 
watered down in practice as the annual number of new entrants has in the past 
few years dropped from about one quarter of a million to 100,000 - remains on 
the books. The Minister for Administrative Development, whose task it is to 
reform the executive bureaucracy, estimates that although “there are five million 
civil servants in Egypt, there are only two million jobs.”7
The consequences of over employment are under work and low pay. Since 
patronage, not production, has been the purpose of government employment, 
output per worker is abysmal. It is in fact the dominance of government 
employment that causes Egyptian labor productivity to be so low by world and 
even developing world standards. A vast amount of labor power is simply 
wasted. Pay scales have not kept pace with inflation for more than two decades, 
an invitation to moonlighting, corruption and/or vocational disinterest. The 
former Secretary General of the People’s Assembly estimated in 1997 that LE5 
billion was spent in that year by citizens bribing public officials to perform 





























































































Since none of these observations is news to any thoughtful Egyptian, or 
even to the man in the street, the obvious question is why has the government 
done so little to reform the executive branch? The answer is twofold. First, the 
government has not entirely abandon the control and patronage functions which 
the present structure was designed to serve. In the absence of political 
infrastructure adequate to the task of representing the population and producing 
public policy in response to its demands, the need for control and patronage 
remains. They are alternative, albeit very inefficient and costly means of 
securing compliance, which participatory, accountable governance does cheaply 
and efficiently.
The second reason why reform of the executive branch has been so 
dilatory is that gradual change is the watchword of the government in all areas, 
this one being no exception. Instead of attempting a sudden, root and branch 
overhaul of the executive, the government appears to have embarked on a more 
cautious, end run strategy. This approach leaves most of the present structure 
more or less as it is, presumably out of the calculation that it will be gradually 
downsized as a side effect of the human aging process and steadily marginalized 
as its jurisdiction is reduced both naturally and by act of government.
As is the case with the public sector, the strategy has the additional 
component of “growing” a new “private” sector (i.e., public administration) 
alongside the existing one. In this case the emerging parallel structure consists of 
new or “recycled” executive bodies that are intended to serve purposes 
consistent with a free market economy, such as the Capital Markets Authority, 
the Ministry of Public Enterprises (the purpose of which originally, at least, was 
to facilitate privatization), or the Ministry of Supply and its new portfolio 
partner, Trade, which are venerable bureaucratic satraps that have been assigned 
the task of seeking to facilitate Egypt’s compliance with WTO and other 
international obligations pursuant to Egypt’s attempt to globalize. Reform, in 
other words, is proceeding without a concentrated effort to dismantle the pre­
existing system. It is based largely on adding new structures or modifying 
selected, pre-existing ones to perform those new functions associated with a 
more open economy or other newly discerned tasks, such as protecting the 
environment.
There is nothing fundamentally wrong with this approach, other than the 
fact that it will take a long time to implement. It also risks the danger, however, 
that the new components of the executive bureaucracy will be absorbed by the 
old, so that they, too, will become preoccupied by control and the distribution of 
patronage, rather than performing regulatory and other modem tasks in an 




























































































organizational methods of the newly created or remade units of the bureaucracy 
will suffuse the old system, that seems an unlikely outcome unless a conscious, 
sustained effort is made to accomplish it. Such an effort would require 
considerable engagement by the political elite in order to guide the process, to 
say nothing of the need for a reasonably clear decision to downgrade the control 
and patronage functions and upgrade those functions associated with creating a 
modem and accountable regulatory framework.
Structure and its consequence for transparency and accountability
The principal structural characteristics of the executive bureaucracy are 
centralization and isolation of its components. Centralization has two 
manifestations. First, power is concentrated at the top. With regard to the 
executive branch as a whole, for example, the President has virtually 
unrestrained powers, as he appoints the prime minister and cabinet, is elected 
without opposition, is not subject to effective oversight by the parliament, and 
the office over which he directly presides, the Presidency, is a large, complex 
institution, employing many thousands and financed in part in an “off-budget” 
fashion. With regard to other units in the executive, the heads of those units 
typically exercise similarly unrestrained power, albeit only in their restricted 
domain. Ministers, for example, have extensive powers to issue decrees which 
have the force of law, to reward and punish employees, to personally issue 
permits, licenses, and, in the case of some ministries apparently, even contracts. 
The deleterious consequences of such concentration of power for the effective 
functioning of administrative units has been pointed out by virtually every study 
ever conducted of the Egyptian bureaucracy and remains as true today as it was 
when some of those first studies were conducted not long after World War II.
The other component of centralization refers to the concentration of power 
in the national bureaucracy based in Cairo. Virtually every unit of government in 
the country, other than the legislature or elected local popular councils, are 
within a hierarchy that terminates in a minister or equivalent in Cairo. Popular 
councils, typically controlled by their parallel executive council which does, in 
essence, report to Cairo, are in fact only a very partial exception to the general 
rule. There is no real local government in the sense of it being autonomous from 
the center. Officials of the local administration are employees of the Secretariat 
of Local Administration, a unit now in the Prime Minister’s Office. The most 
powerful regional officials, governors, are appointed by the President. There are 
no autonomous, locally organized school districts, police forces, municipal 
services, or anything of the kind. Even the most widespread quasi-NGOs in the 
countryside, Community Development Associations, report up a chain of 




























































































degree of autonomy, they do not in fact directly control most of the staff in their 
govemorates, for that staff is employed by the respective ministries.
Isolation of units of the bureaucracy refers to their “stove pipe” nature, 
i.e., that they are free standing, having few formal or informal linkages to other 
units. Intra-executive coordination and communication is notable in its absence, 
as each ministry, agency, department, govemorate, etc., seeks to both protect and 
expand its “turf.” Many of these units, especially ministries, are worlds unto 
themselves, possessing their own supermarkets, holiday and retirement resorts, 
police forces, training institutes, and so on. They are constructed and operate in 
inward-looking fashion, with their employees rewarded for loyalty and 
perseverance within that unit. Staff transfers from one executive unit to another 
are highly unusual. Once a graduate is assigned to a ministry or agency, (s)he 
tends to remain there for life. Competition and rivalry between various 
ministries, such as that between agriculture and public works, supply and 
industry, economics and finance, etc., is legendary.
The centralized, internally autonomous nature of the executive 
bureaucracy renders not only efficiency, but transparency and accountability 
almost impossible to achieve. Because the implementation of virtually any aspect 
of public policy typically requires inputs from various units, and because there 
are few mechanisms to coordinate those inputs because no actors want to 
surrender any degree of autonomy, lest their turf be negatively affected, 
implementation suffers. In the bureaucratic maze through which virtually any 
public policy matter must pass, transparency vanishes and accountability 
becomes impossible to enforce. The buck is passed endlessly, for there is no 
superior unit at which it might stop and no unit will accept responsibility when 
some other unit is involved, however marginally.
With a bureaucratic structure inherently incompatible with efficiency, 
transparency and accountability, it might have been anticipated that some 
institutionalized efforts to cope with these problems, if not actually to remove 
them, would have been undertaken. Alas, this is not the case. With the exception 
of the administrative courts under the Council of State there are few if any 
mechanisms to ensure accountability, by which is inferred the ability of someone 
outside the system, or an inferior within it, to review the actions of and, if 
necessary, punish a superior. There is, for example, no legislation to protect 
whistle blowers. Supervision, on the other, which refers to top down control, 
there is aplenty, but it tends to be focussed on lower level officialdom. The 
Administrative Controls Authority, for example, has filed in 1998 over 6,000 
cases of corruption, all of which have been below the level of assistant deputy 




























































































the chief means by which Parliament could hold individual members of the 
executive accountable, including high ranking ones, was transferred in June 
1998 to the Presidency.
There are also inadequate means to effect coordination between units of 
the executive administration. The most common method is that of ad hoc inter- 
ministerial committees, of which there are many. The rarely meet, however, are 
only semi-formal, lack autonomous staff, have no significant binding powers 
and, as a result, have little overall impact. The Shrouk Project, for example, one 
of the purposes of which was to overcome the problem of lack of coordination in 
the delivery of services to villages, itself became an actor in this area and for all 
intents and purposes gave up any pretense of even seeking to coordinate between 
ministries, one manifestation of this surrender to the inevitable being the fate of 
its interministerial committee, which was allowed to lapse about a year after it 
was formed.
Unlike in Lebanon, where civil service reform gave rise to various 
agencies and programs almost thirty years ago, and which are now being 
resuscitated as part of an effort to overhaul that executive bureaucracy, Egypt 
has no equivalents in the form of autonomous bodies whose purpose is to 
oversee performance and enforce accountability on specific personnel and units. 
There are no ombudspersons who might provide opportunities for the public or 
employees to seek redress against the bureaucracy - only the courts which are 
clogged and increasingly ineffective themselves.
In sum, the executive branch is not efficient, transparent, nor accountable 
in its operations. Its very organization militates against these objectives, while 
few if any efforts of institutionalizing administrative reform have been 
undertaken.
Politicization
The executive bureaucracy is the main political arena in the country. Most public 
policy is made within and implemented by that bureaucracy. Most meaningful 
political contestation, if by that is meant contestation that results in policy 
outcomes measured by allocation of material resources, occurs between 
individuals and units within the executive bureaucracy. Those actively seeking to 
influence public policy, such as business persons, operate primarily within the 
executive, even if they are members of Parliament.8 The executive branch, in 
sum, both makes and implements most public policy, hence is the focal point for 




























































































This concentration of power over public policy by the executive has 
negative implications for participation, transparency and accountability. Since 
access to the executive is differential and even preferential, with “wasta” 
(influence) being far from equally distributed among sectors of the population, 
an executive-centered public policy system necessarily is in egalitarian. It also 
discourages formalized, group based participation in the making of policy, and 
encourages personal solutions to problems.
An ideal-typical bureaucracy, to the extent it is open to external 
interventions, is designed primarily to permit individual petitioners to seek 
redress against the manner in which policy is implemented. But when a 
bureaucracy is the main arena in which policy is made, it does it poorly because 
it lacks mechanisms for representation, for aggregating differing demands into 
policy options, and for proceeding in a public and open fashion. Unlike the 
legislature, the bureaucracy needs to be at least in part a “closed” institution, a 
condition that militates against the making of effective and legitimate public 
policy. Policy made in a bureaucracy is likely to be overly influenced by the 
concerns of the particular unit of that bureaucracy within which the policy is 
made. Separation of the policy making and policy implementation functions is a 
vital step forward in brining about transparent, accountable, representative 
government. It is a step that has not been taken in Egypt, for most public policy 
continues to be made behind the largely closed doors of the executive 
bureaucracy.
A further negative consequence of the bureaucracy being the locus of 
policy making is that struggles for political influence tend to be opaque and 
personalized and result in public resources being utilized in those struggles. The 
principal business of legislatures is reaching agreement on issues of public 
policy, so those bodies are set up to convert contestation into policy outcomes 
without the contestants being able to draw upon external resources, such as 
public employees, in their efforts to gain advantage. But bureaucracies are 
organized to implement policy and do have direct control over resources. When 
they are utilized in the making of policy, they invite conflicts that quickly result 
in the mobilization of public resources by the parties to that conflict, thereby 
undermining effective policy implementation and eroding accountability, to say 
nothing of what might be called a misappropriation of public resources for 
political purposes.
The executive branch - summary
The executive branch is that part of the political infrastructure that was most 




























































































time. Its primary goals are yet to be redefined in such a way as to be supportive 
of an open market economy and polity. Its organization and operations, 
therefore, are for the most part inimical to economic and political structural 
adjustment, although some progress is being made to create new units and 
procedures. Because the executive remains the primary arena within which 
public policy is made, it both forestalls the institutionalization of political 
participation within interest groups and political parties, and encourages 
personalism and the seeking of individual solutions to what are largely policy 
problems. Neither transparent nor accountable, far too large and performing 
tasks for which it is not designed, the executive bureaucracy must be downsized 
and substantially overhauled if Egypt is to improve labor productivity, create a 
better climate for investment, have adequate participation in the making of 
public policy, and implement public policy efficiently. But key to any reform 
effort must be a redefinition of the primary purposes of the executive 
bureaucracy.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: 
PARADOXICAL RELATIONS?
An apparent paradox of the Egyptian political economy suggested by the almost 
completely unreformed state of the legal/judicial system and the executive 
branch, is that economic stabilization and structural adjustment have not given 
rise to equivalent measures of political liberalization. Several explanations of 
this paradox are possible, one of which is that it is not a paradox at all, for that 
relationship does not always obtain, as some readings of the East Asian 
experience suggest. A second explanation is that the polity has pluralized, in the 
sense that objective and even subjective political interests have become much 
more numerous, but that these potential new political actors, deterred by a 
political climate inhospitable to expanded participation and by their lack of 
political experience and skills, are yet to actively enter the political arena. In 
other words, there is an inevitable lag between economic structural adjustment 
and its political counterpart, for while the former creates new political interests 
and actors relatively quickly, a pluralistic political system in which they can 
compete for influence necessarily takes more time to evolve.
Other possible explanations of the paradox focus on the rate and nature of 
economic change. Some data suggest that the rate of economic growth in Egypt, 
which began to accelerate appreciably only in 1992 and has just recently reached 
what appears to be a sustainable rate in excess of five percent, is either too low 
and/or too recent to have had much of an impact on the polity. Closely related 




























































































manufacturing industry, remains closer to the command than the market model, 
so there is insufficient economic diversification and liberalization to drive any 
political equivalent; or 2), that the command economy has fundamentally 
changed, but has become one based on rent-seeking by crony capitalists tied to 
the regime, so that newly generated private material resources serve to reinforce 
the political status quo, rather than to modify it.
A comprehensive explanation of the paradox should probably incorporate 
some elements from all of these perspectives. As regards skepticism about the 
relationship between economic and political structural adjustment, clearly there 
is no one-to-one relationship between them, as the East Asian empirical evidence 
may attest. On the other hand, it is also true to say that economic development 
led by private sectors in Latin America, Africa and even Asia has been 
associated with democratization, as Samuel P. Huntington and others have 
observed. In the Middle East/North Africa region the example of Morocco seems 
to confirm the relationship, for in the decade of the nineties it has been the Arab 
state that has made most progress in liberalizing both its economy and its polity, 
and in that order. Theoretically the argument seems compelling that greater 
availability of private material resources, combined with an increasingly diverse 
set of economic interests, will ultimately lead to contestation between those 
interests. Where and how that contestation occurs, however, is probably 
determined by a host of political factors, a point which will be returned to below.
That the Egyptian political economy is more pluralistic than it was in the 
early 1970s, in that there are now many more different types of economic 
interests, is certainly the case. And it is also true that some objective, categorical 
groups have become subjectively aware. Various strands of Islamism appear to 
represent, at least in part, different economic sectors or strata, while a host of 
associations have emerged to represent business interests in the political arena. 
But it is also the case that emerging economic categorical interests, such as those 
of private sector service and production workers, or middle class professionals, 
have yet to be transformed into subjective, manifest political actors. Political 
mobilization and organization, at least of a democratic, non-violent nature, have 
clearly lagged behind the sharper articulation and definition of different 
economic interests, a result no doubt in part of the legacy of the command 
economy and polity, where autonomy of all sorts was discouraged, and the 
relatively inhospitable environment for political organization that persists until 
this day.
But much of the explanation of lagging political structural adjustment 
probably does lie with the rate and nature of economic change. That change has 




























































































thoroughgoing enough to fundamentally alter the life chances and styles of vast 
numbers of Egyptians. Real GNP growth per capita has over the past decade 
amounted to a little more than one percent per annum, a rate at which it takes 
about a quarter of a century for the average Egyptian’s income to double, 
probably too slow a pace to have a dramatic effect on life styles or politically 
relevant perceptions. During this period real wages have in fact remained 
constant or declined slightly. Growth of GDP fell below the average for Less 
Developed Countries in 1992 and, despite increasing since that time, remains 
below that average.9
At the macro economic level, a 1998 report by the Research Information 
Sector of the Ministry of Economy notes that “the underlying structure of 
industrial production in Egypt has yet to be substantially restructured and 
modernized,” and that “the present condition of the Egyptian economy is a 
vestige of the former centrally planned approach to economic development.”10 
The IMF noted in 1998 that ‘The overall quantitative contribution of the public 
sector in GDP has remained virtually unchanged in the last decade.”11 Although 
the private sector’s share of Gross Domestic Investment increased from 45 per 
cent in 1988 to 73 per cent in 1996, its share of Gross Domestic Output 
stagnated. This is because private sector investment has been concentrated in the 
service sector, whereas the commodity producing sectors, such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, petroleum and construction remain dominated by the public 
sector. The private sector’s share of output in the commodity producing sectors 
has yet to reach one third, despite the fact that it stood at 32 per cent as long ago 
as 1983.12 Slightly more than one in three participants in the civilian labor force 
are still employed by the government, a ratio that has not changed for two 
decades. 58% of governmental current expenditure is on wages or interest 
payments, reflecting the persistence of an overgrown state, but one that is 
financially incapable of maintaining adequate rates of investment. Public 
investment has over the past decade been declining at about 7 per cent per 
annum. Manufacturing’s share of GDP has stagnated as industry’s share of total 
fixed investment fell from more than one quarter to less than one fifth in the 
period 1988-1996.13
In sum, neither the rate of absolute growth, nor the rate at which private 
economic activity has supplanted that under direct state ownership, nor the rate 
of industrialization, is sufficiently rapid to dramatically impact the life styles or 
chances of the bulk of the population. Indeed, one of the Government of Egypt’s 
stated objectives regarding economic reform, frequently repeated by the 
President, has been to avoid destabilizing changes and the negative experiences 
of some other countries that have undergone dramatic transitions from socialism 




























































































but at a heavy price in terms of forgone economic growth.
Another component of economic change that could have directly impacted 
large numbers of Egyptians, but which for the most part has not, is rapid and 
thoroughgoing integration into the global economy. Indeed, Egypt is in a small 
group of Less Developed Countries that is actually “de-globalizing.” “Openness, 
measured by the sum of real trade. . .as a share of real GDP is declining in 
Egypt. This decrease (from 34 percent to 23 percent over the period from 1981- 
83 to 1991-93), is pushing down the level of Egypt’s integration with the world 
economy.”14 The volume of Egypt’s exports has declined steadily since 1994. 
The ratio of total trade to GDP is now lower than it was a decade earlier. Egypt’s 
share of world exports has declined, from .2% in 1985 to .07% in 1995, while its 
share of world imports has declined from .5% to .2% over that same period. 
Egypt’s market share in the EU fell from 1% in 1985 to half that already low 
level a decade later.15 The IMF noted in 1988 that Egypt’s tariffs were “among 
the most restrictive in the region and higher than in other emerging markets.”16
Egypt is also not participating in the revolution in global communications 
at a level commensurate with its comparative stage of development. As the 
report of the Ministry of Economy previously cited notes, “Egypt lags behind a 
large number of the comparison countries with respect to most indicators” (of 
information sources.)17 It has fewer daily newspapers, televisions, mobile 
phones, fax machines, personal computers and Internet hosts per 1,000 
inhabitants than almost all comparators among lower and middle income 
developing countries. Although more exposed to global communications than a 
decade ago, Egyptians are much less well integrated into global communication 
networks than many of their fellow Arabs, to say nothing of most Latin 
Americans and Asians.
Egypt’s economic growth and its rates of expansion of private economic 
activity and globalization are thus, in comparative perspective, not as dramatic as 
those in East Asia and are, for the most part, below the average for Less 
Developed Countries and those in its own Middle East/North Africa region. That 
political change has also been comparatively slow is thus not anomalous, for the 
economic forces driving it have been less profound than in many other, roughly 
comparable countries.
Moreover, the nature of the economic change that has occurred over the 
past two decades has mitigated its impact on the political system, something 
which was no doubt intended by those directing that change. While privatization 
has occurred, it has not led to substantial economic, hence political autonomy. 




























































































retained indirect control in virtually all of them. “Quasi-privatization" has 
spawned a group of “crony capitalists” rather than truly independent 
entrepreneurs, as is suggested by 1) anecdotal evidence of various sorts, 
including the presence of a few tens of businessmen at the head of most 
significant economic undertakings; 2) by the nature of most large business 
conglomerates, which are for the most part neither vertically nor horizontally 
integrated, but instead are almost random collections of different business 
undertakings, suggesting that they have been brought under the same ownership 
roof as a result of rent-seeking rather than comparative business advantage; 3) by 
the macroeconomic evidence that reveals the inward orientation of the economy, 
including the private sector, for rent-seeking and cronyism are antithetical to the 
production of goods and services for export; and 4) by the political logic that 
underlies the management of economic change, a subject to which we will now 
turn.
PARADOX RESOLVED?
That the rate of economic growth has been relatively low, that private economic 
activity has not expanded either more rapidly or into more sectors, especially 
commodity producing ones, and that Egypt has failed to take adequate advantage 
of the huge growth in trade and foreign private investment that has characterized 
the global economy over the past two decades, results at least partially from the 
subordination of economic to political logic by those directing economic policy. 
In other words the relationship between economic and political change should 
not be thought of as linear, for it is in fact circular, with political calculations 
impacting the rate and type of economic change, and that change then feeding 
back into the political system.
Viewed in this light the paradox of lagging political structural adjustment 
is better understood. The scope and depth of economic reform has been limited 
by an incumbent political elite that fears the economic and, more importantly, 
political consequences of what they consider to be too rapid, uncontrolled, 
unpredictable change. Among those fears, and probably the key one, is loss of 
incumbency. The strategy has thus been one intended to perpetuate state control, 
while divesting the state of at least some ownership and permitting a private 
sector, linked closely to the state, to grow up alongside it. Crony capitalism has 
been the inevitable result of this cautious reform, for the “cronies” pose, by 





























































































But what are the economic and political futures of this emerging crony 
capitalism? Two quite diametrically opposed interpretations are possible. One is 
that crony capitalism is a stage in the process of development of a more 
competitive, more open free market system. In this view a more pluralistic 
capitalism will gradually suffuse the system for both economic and political 
reasons. Crony capitalists will spawn imitators, so competition will necessarily 
increase over time. The interests of the cronies themselves will cause them to 
seek reductions in state control over the economy and, ultimately, the polity. 
International pressures of various sorts that impinge on the domestic economy 
and force it to become more open to external influences will also enhance 
domestic competition and provide opportunities for new entrants to the system. 
Privatization will ultimately erode much of the economic power base of the state, 
including that of the military-industrial complex. Economic success and political 
stability will feed the confidence of incumbent political elites who will respond 
by permitting steadily greater latitude for investors. Rent seeking mentalities will 
steadily give way to the understanding that broadly based economic growth will 
pay the greatest economic and political benefits. In short, crony capitalism is a 
way station on the path to gradual economic reform of a command political 
economy in which the political elite is insufficiently confident to suddenly throw 
open the doors to rapid economic and political change. As such it will play a 
functional, transitional role for the further development of the political economy.
An alternative interpretation is much less benign. It is that crony 
capitalism is not a way station on the road to a more open, competitive free 
market system, but is an alternative and hindrance to other, more productive 
forms of capitalism and to accountable governance as well. The nexus between 
the political elite and crony capitalists is too central to the system, too 
institutionalized, and too remunerative to both sides for it easily to be broken. 
Neither side has an interest in modifying rent-seeking arrangements, and 
outsiders, whether Egyptians or foreigners, have insufficient leverage to do so. 
Entrenched in power and protected by purposeful lack of transparency, crony 
capitalists and their protectors in the state ensure that competitors do not arise. 
So, for example, they perpetuate tariff barriers to protect monopolized domestic 
markets secured through rent-seeking arrangements, or they lobby for an over 
valued currency in order to continue to access imports at lower prices, again in 
order to service protected markets. Thus crony capitalism retains domestic 
monopolistic and oligopolistic control and serves to insulate the economy from 
globalization, thereby perpetuating that cronyism while frustrating economic 
growth.
These alternative explanations lead to starkly differing interpretations of 




























































































of gradually liberalizing the economy, then it is reasonable to anticipate that as 
the economy becomes more pluralistic, so too will the polity. Incumbent political 
elites will have steadily less reason to restrict the polity, for rent-seeking 
behavior will gradually be supplanted by that which encourages productive 
competition. As economic playing fields become more level, so too will 
associated political ones. Competition between crony and entrepreneurial 
capitalists will increase, and the state will gradually assume the role of referee 
rather than direct player. Resources for political mobilization and contestation 
will grow, making possible a competitive political order that is much more 
independent of the state and its allocation strategies.
If crony capitalism is not a way station, however, but the final destination 
of this particular type of economic change, then the political prognosis is very 
different. Retardation of economic growth, combined with frustration of rising 
expectations and widespread awareness of rent-seeking and cronyism, is bound 
to foster political discontent. The case of Indonesia illustrates the type of 
political backlash that can suddenly overwhelm a political economy beset by 
cronyism. Precisely because crony capitalism frustrated the rise of a viable 
political opposition there, direct transition to a more competitive, open political 
economy in the wake of Suharto’s departure is virtually impossible, so the 
spectre of political breakdown and even widespread chaos hangs over that 
country.
Neither the empirical evidence nor any theoretical model is sufficiently 
clear and compelling to permit accurate assessment of the real role of crony 
capitalism in Egypt’s development, to say nothing of predicting the future 
direction of economic and political structural adjustment. With regard to the 
latter, very divergent scenarios are equally possible. One is that the highly 
successful stabilization program that has been implemented since 1991 will have 
been demonstrated to have laid the basis for an equally successful economic 
structural adjustment and for sustained, increasingly rapid growth. Evidence in 
support of this scenario can be found. Labor costs have become steadily more 
competitive during this decade and appear now to be attracting some foreign 
direct investment. An increases in portfolio investment in Egyptian equities over 
the past couple of years has taken place, suggesting that flight capital from Asia, 
combined with competitive price/eamings ratios of Egyptian equities, as well as 
positive perceptions by investors of the stabilization program and future political 
stability - reinforced by favorable ratings of Egyptian bonds and equities by 
international agencies - all signal that the long awaited “take o ff’ could be 
triggered by an inflow of much needed investment funds. Under this scenario the 
delayed privatizations in the financial sub-sectors would now accompany those 





























































































from the Uruguay Round and from concluding a bilateral trade agreement with 
the EU would further reduce barriers to trade, and Egypt would finally be on the 
path to sustained integration into the global economy and attendant growth. Its 
crony capitalists, having developed their capacities in the protected domestic 
markets of the 1980s and 1990s, would reinvent themselves as dynamic, 
competitive entrepreneurs and be joined by many new aspirants. Unemployment 
would decline and as the political pressure that has accumulated as a result of 
inadequate economic growth dissipated, pluralization of the polity would 
progress. In sum, Egypt would demonstrate the case that political structural 
adjustment is not a precondition for its economic counterpart and that the 
optimal development strategy is one of delaying political structural adjustment 
until more rapid economic growth has been attained.
An alternative, pessimistic, “Indonesian” scenario, which would support 
the contention that political structural adjustment is necessary for sustained 
economic growth and should, therefore, precede or accompany economic 
structural adjustment, can also be supported by the available evidence. The long 
term, secular trends of low domestic savings rates and lack of integration into 
MNC global production chains (hence stagnant exports), combined with shorter 
term problems of an expanding current account deficit resulting from 
overdependence on raw materials exports (oil, oil products and raw cotton) and 
other volatile sources of foreign currency (i.e., tourism, Suez Canal receipts and 
worker remittances), as well as an overvalued currency, could at some stage 
result in an economic crisis that would wreak havoc with the stabilization 
program, thereby further de-globalizing the economy and delaying structural 
adjustment. Were such a crisis to occur, crony capitalists and others would likely 
“dollarize” and expatriate capital, bringing yet more pressure on the Egyptian 
Pound, possibly forcing a panicky devaluation which would in turn dramatically 
aggravate social and political problems and possibly have a significant impact on 
overall governmental legitimacy.
Of course it is also possible that growth rates will increase moderately and 
be accompanied either by incremental or virtually no political structural 
adjustment, thereby indicating that there is no necessary connection between 





























































































Whether one of these or some other scenario eventuates, two developments are 
already clear. First, recent economic change, even though neither rapid nor 
comprehensive by global standards, has generated objective new economic 
interests, some of which have already taken on subjective importance in that 
those who share material interests have begun to act collectively in pursuit of 
them. This process is bound to continue to intensify and affect more social strata 
than heretofore. Second, socio-political pressures resulting from economic 
change have been met not by an expansion of political participation, but by 
containment of it. Associated with this containment has been retention of a 
political infrastructure that on the face of it appears not to be supportive of 
economic structural adjustment, and probably is inimical to it. The absence of 
political infrastructure capable of producing public policies and legitimating 
those making and implementing them, has encouraged the development of crony 
capitalism, for it promises economic growth, does not challenge political 
incumbents, and in fact provides them with patronage resources vital to their 
continued rule. The future of this Faustian bargain is not clear. It may contain the 
seeds of transition to a more entrepreneurial, free market capitalism, or to the 
collapse of the political economy altogether, bringing down all of those who 
joined in that bargain. While it is theoretically possible that the status quo could 
continue indefinitely, that seems unlikely given the non-sustainability of de­
globalization coupled with a steadily deteriorating balance of payments. 
Ultimately economic logic, if subordinated systematically to political 
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